Stated Environmental Consciousness and Preferences : Preliminary Analysis using Experimental Data from the Shipbreaking Area of Chittagong by 東田 啓作 et al.
??Stated Environmental
Consciousness and Preferences:
Preliminary Analysis using
Experimental Data from the
Shipbreaking Area of Chittagong¤
Keisaku Higashida¤¤ ?
Mohammad Mosharraf Hossain¤¤¤ ?
Shinsuke Murakami¤¤¤¤ ?
Focusing on the shipbreaking area in Chittagong, Bangladesh, we
investigate the WTP of local residents for improvement in the environment
around the shipbreaking area and for improvement of the cleanliness
of public spaces in their own communities. We extend the research
of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) in the following two aspects: First,
we investigate residents' preferences such as risk preference and time
preference using the method of ¯eld experiments. Second, we delve into
* We are grateful to Mohammad Sujauddin, Sadeka Tasmin, Iftakharul Alam, Ohidul
Alam, Saikat Acharjee, Tanzina Dilshad, Farhana Begum Remun, Mustainur Rah-
man, and members of YPSA (Young Power in Social Action) for their assistance
in carrying out the ¯eld survey. Without their help, we could not complete it.
Moreover, Captain Mohammed Anam Chowdhury, a owner of a shipbreaking yard
kindly explained the situation of the shipbreaking industry. I also acknowledge
the 21th century Bunka Gakujyutsu Zaidan (Kikawada Foundation) and Kwansei
Gakuin University for ¯nancial aids.
** School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, 1-155, Ichiban-cho, Uegahara,
Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501, Japan. E-mail: keisaku@kwansei.ac.jp
*** Institute of Forestry and Environmental Sciences, University of Chittagong, Chit-
tagong 4331, Bangladesh. E-mail: mosharraf@ifescu.ac.bd
****Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo,
Tokyo, 113-8656, Japan. E-mail: smurakam@sys.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp
| 39 |
?????? 68 ?? 2 ?
the e®ect of experience. We obtain several signi¯cant results on the
relationship between the WTP and personal and community attributes
and experience. For example, the age has signi¯cantly and negatively
in°uences the WTP. It is also veri¯ed that female subjects give less
contribution as compared with male subjects. In addition, subjects who
have experience of working at the shipbreaking yards and/or who live
in communities far from the shipbreaking yards give less contribution as
compared with subjects who do not have experience of working at the
shipbreaking yards and/or who live in communities near the shipbreaking
yards. Moreover, for the WTPSY, the number of living year has a
positive e®ect on the contribution. We also provide possible reasons for
these results.
?? JEL?C93, O13, Q56
Keywords?Field experiment, preference, shipbreaking, willingness to pay
1 Introduction
Some environmental problems are local, while others are global. When
focusing on local environmental problems, voluntary management schemes
by local people were observed and considered to be e®ective.1) Whether
voluntary schemes can be implemented or not depends on not only the
willingness-to-pay (WTP) of local people for public bene¯ts but also
their behavior for group projects because they actually have to pay
costs for the operation of voluntary schemes.
Even if considering mandatory schemes by local and central governments,
whether local people willingly pay for protection of the environment
is critical for policy implementation and, accordingly, improvement of
local environmental conditions. Without willingness to pay for the
environment, governments may face objections to strict environmental
1) For example, in the case of coastal ¯sheries in Japan, ¯shers operate resource
management schemes voluntarily. See Makino and Matsuda (2005) for the
details. For the case of Korean ¯sheries, see Uchida et al. (2010) among
others.
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policies.
Economic bene¯ts often play a critical role in the acceptance of
environmental protection policies. In particular, in developing countries,
people often prefer economic development to environmental protection.
In terms of basic microeconomic theory, it is natural to consider that
marginal utility from economic development is much greater than that
from improvement in the environment for those people. However, we
are also able to observe serious environmental problems across the
world. Without proper enforcement of environmental laws, environmental
degradation causes losses for the present and the future. In such cases,
governments have to ¯nd a balance between economic bene¯ts and
environmental protection policies.
Thus, it is important for local and central governments to know
residents' preferences, behavior, and WTP. Optimal policies can be
designed according to preferences and values. When their preference is
considered to be biased because of ignorance, governments may have to
pay for education and di®usion of correct information. Currently, even
in developing countries, people are often familiar with the negative e®ect
of pollutants and toxic substances. For example, Bangladeshi people are
familiar with the negative health e®ect of arsenic that is contained in
ground water.2) Thus, it is meaningful to investigate their WTP.
Focusing on the shipbreaking area in Chittagong, Bangladesh, we
investigate the WTP of local residents for improvement in the environment
around the shipbreaking area and for improvement of the cleanliness of
public spaces in their own communities.
We extend the research of WTP in the following two aspects: First, it
is reported that stated WTP may be biased. Thus, we also investigate
2) Education by both NGOs and the government has contributed to the di®usion
of this knowledge.
| 41 |
?????? 68 ?? 2 ?
residents' preferences such as risk preference and time preference. Usually,
as will be explained later, these preferences in°uence WTP and behavior.
For example, intuitively and theoretically, it is considered that the more
farsighted a resident is, the more money s/he is likely to pay for protection
of the environment because s/he will receive environmental bene¯ts in
the future. Then, we can verify whether the stated WTP is consistent
with these preferences. Field experiments developed in Economics are
powerful tools to investigate these preferences. The measurement of
WTP using ¯eld experiments has been carried out for the past decade
(Comecho-cuena et al. 2004, Bryan and Jowett, 2010, Chowdhury et al.,
2011, Buckley et al., 2012, Amador et al., 2013, Disdier and Merette,
2013).3) We follow this method.
Second, we delve into the importance of experience.4) Some local
residents may have experienced serious health problems caused by
pollutants and toxic materials, or may have experienced an injury
because of unsafe conditions of their work places. Some residents
are migratory while others are sedentary. The former residents have
experiences of moving while the latter residents are familiar with local
history. These factors relating to experience may in°uence preferences
and WTP.
The main results for the WTP are as follows. The age has signi¯cantly
and negatively in°uences the WTP. It is also veri¯ed that female subjects
give less contribution as compared with male subjects. Subjects who
3) Experimental methods have been applied to other ¯elds of environmental and
resource economics. For example, see Anderson (2004), Anderson and Sutinen
(2005), Anderson and Sutinen (2006), Anderson et al. (2008), Nguyen and
Leung (2009), Velez et al. (2010) for the case of ¯sheries management.
4) The e®ect of experience on risk and time preferences has also been focused
on for the past few decades. For example, see Becker and Mulligan (1997),
Netzer (2009), Dercon (1996), Harbaugh et al. (2002), Voors et al. (2012).
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have experience of working at the shipbreaking yards and/or who live
in communities far from the shipbreaking yards give less contribution as
compared with subjects who do not have experience of working at the
shipbreaking yards and/or who live in communities near the shipbreaking
yards. In addition, the number of living year has a positive e®ect on the
contribution. We provide possible reasons for these results. Moreover,
we examine the preferences and behavior of subjects in experimental
games.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 and 3 describe
the history and situation of the shipbreaking industry and our ¯eld
experimental survey, respectively. Section 4 examines the preferences and
behavior of subjects using the results of experimental games. Section 5
investigates the WTP for improvement in both the shipbreaking area
and their own communities. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 Background of the Survey
When large-scale ships such as passenger liners, freighters, and tankers
become old, they are scrapped. The average lives of ships depend on the
economic and market conditions. When the global economic conditions
are good, the demand for transportation increases, and the lives of
various types of ships become longer. Moreover, new ships are built
and introduced to the transportation industry. In this situation, ship
owners do not have incentives to dispose of their ships because the
pro¯t dominates the cost of ownership. In contrast, when the economy
is stagnant, the demand for transportation drops, and ship owners
have incentives to scrap their ships even if they can still be used for
transportation.
This large demand °uctuation is one of important features of the
ship transportation industry. For the scrapping/recycling industry,
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the scrapping behavior of ship owners directly in°uences the supply
condition. In other words, the supply °uctuates over time. Until the
1970s, shipbreaking was mainly performed in developed countries such
as the United States, EU, and Japan. However, due to the supply
variation, it would have been costly for these countries to maintain the
facilities for shipbreaking if the process was capital intensive. Moreover,
wages were increasing in this period in developed countries. Thus, it
would also have been costly to keep the shipbreaking industry in these
countries even if the process had been labor intensive.
Thus, the production shift began from those developed countries to
developing countries. First, the industry was relocated to Korea and
Taiwan. These countries, however, had experienced economic development
by the 1990s, and the same situation, such as wage increases, occurred.
Then, the next destination for the shipbreaking industry was the South
Asian Countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
In these countries, the shipbreaking process is de¯nitely labor intensive.
In the case of Chittagong, many shipbreaking yards occupy part of the
beach side by side. We can see old ships and wreckages on the coastline.
The processes of shipbreaking are as follows:5) First, a ship operator
runs a scrapped ship aground at high tide. Second, when the tide is
low, workers are able to access the ship on foot. They dismantle the
ship manually with small machines.
There are merits and drawbacks to this shipbreaking industry for
these countries. The merits are as follows: First, this industry provides
job opportunities for local people.6) In particular, there are many poor
5) The description of the processes depends on the ¯eld survey and interviews
to an owner of one of shipbreaking yards, which was carried out by the
authors in June, October, and November 2013.
6) Poorer people often migratory in search of jobs. In this respect, it is possible
that workers from an entire country are working at shipbreaking yards.
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people in these countries. This opportunity itself is important for them.
Second, after being dismantled, almost all parts are reused or recycled.
For example, kitchen equipment is often used by local restaurants as they
are. Moreover, iron parts are recycled and often used for constructing
small buildings.7) Therefore, shipbreaking contributes to the economy
of these countries.
The drawbacks are as follows: A typical problem is environmental
pollution. If this industry was located in a developed country, the
process would be environmentally friendly because environmental laws
have been developed and they are well enforced. Moreover, people
are environmentally conscious. Thus, ¯rms are concerned with the
environmental e®ects of their activities. However, environmental laws
have not yet been made in many developing countries. Even if they exist,
they often do not function e®ectively. Thus, when ships are dismantled,
various types of pollutants are emitted into the sea and the air, which
causes serious environmental degradation. Second, health problems are
sometimes observed in workers. Toxic materials such as asbestos are
often left, as they do not have proper management in those yards.
Workers often did not have enough safety tools such as helmets.8) This
situation can lead to health problems and injury of workers.
3 Design of Experimental and Questionnaire Survey
We conducted a series of experimental surveys in February, March,
and April in 2014 in the suburban area of Chittagong City, Bangladesh.9)
7) Because iron deteriorates over time, it is di±cult for scrapped iron to be
used to construct high-rise up-to-date buildings.
8) The safety tool situations have been improving over the past decade.
9) To be precise, February 23, 24, and 25, March 25 and 26, April 16 and 17.
Two sessions were carried out (one in the morning and one in the afternoon)
on each day.
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Experimental games were conducted by one of the author, Dr. Mohammad
Sujauddin, and 5 graduate students of the Chittagong University.10) The
details of the experimental survey are as follows.
3.1 Targeted Area and Subjects
Chittagong City faces the Indian Sea, and has a long-distance beach.
Part of the beach has been occupied by shipbreaking yards for the past
few decades.11)
We conducted our experimental and questionnaire survey in 14
communities/subvillages around the shipbreaking area in the suburban
area of Chittagong. One session was conducted in each subvillage. 16
subjects participated in each session. In terms of main occupation,
residents of 3 subvillages mainly work in trades, those of 8 subvillages are
mainly ¯shers, and those of the other 3 subvillages are mainly farmers.
In terms of the distance from the shipbreaking yards, 6 subvillages are
far from shipbreaking yards, and the other 8 subvillages are near the
shipbreaking yards. See Table 1 for the addresses of those subvillages.
In total, 148 male subjects and 76 female subjects participated in our
experimental survey.
3.2 Experimental Sessions
We conducted ¯ve types of games. In this subsection, we describe
four of them which we focus on in this paper: Games 1, 2, 3 and 5.
First, we conducted a game (Game 1) to investigate risk preference. We
consider that risk preference may be in°uenced by experience related
10) Dr. Mohammad Sujauddin and the graduate students of the Chittagong
University had more than 10 training sessions in June and November 2013
with the authors.
11) For the history and situation of the shipbreaking industry, see Puthucherril
(2010) for example.
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Table 1. Targeted Communities
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to environmental and health issues, or risk preference may a®ect the
behavior of people. This game consisted of 3 series of questions: Series 1
consisted of 14 questions, Series 2 consisted of 14 questions, and Series
3 consisted of 7 questions. In total, there were 35 questions. In each
question, subjects chose between two alternatives: Choice A and Choice
B. Both choices were types of gambles for the subjects. Figure 1(a)
shows an example. Consider a situation in which there are 10 balls
numbered 1 through 10. If the number 1 ball comes out, those who
chose Choice A will receive BDT 200, and those who chose Choice B
will receive BDT 340.12) If the number 3 ball comes out, those who
chose Choice A will receive BDT 200 and those who chose Choice B
will receive BDT 25. If the number 6 ball comes out, those who chose
Choice A will receive BDT 50 and those who chose Choice B will receive
BDT 25. After they completed the record sheet, we drew one numbered
card to select 1 question out of 35 questions. We played the game with
12) BDT denotes the Bangladesh currency: Bangladesh Taka. In the period of
experiment, 1 US dollar was approximately equal to BDT 75.
| 47 |
?????? 68 ?? 2 ?
the selected question for real money.
Some questions included negative rewards. See Figure 1(b) for example.
For this question, if the number 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 ball comes out, those
who chose Choice A will receive BDT 125, and those who chose Choice
B will receive BDT 150. On the other hand, if the number 6, 7, 8, 9
or 10 ball comes out, those who chose Choice A will lose BDT 20 and
those who chose Choice B will lose BDT 105. Other sample questions
are shown in Figure 1(c).
Second, we conducted a question-based game to investigate time
preference. Time preference can also be critical for people's environmental
behavior because they will receive environmental bene¯ts in the future
whereas they have to pay for protection of the environment today.
This game consisted of 9 series of questions: each series consisted of 5
questions, which means that there were 45 questions in total. These
questions were also simple pairwise choices between two alternatives:
receiving an amount of money today (or tomorrow), or receiving a larger
amount of money in the future. Figure 2(a) shows a sample question.
For this question, if you choose Choice A, you will receive BDT 300
one month from now. If you choose Choice B, you will receive BDT
50 today. Other sample questions are shown in Figure 2(b).
After all subjects completed all of the questions, we put 45 cards in
a bingo bag and drew one card to determine which question would be
played for real money.13)
The third was a type of dictator game. In this game, 8 pairs were
made randomly. Each subject did not know who was the partner exactly.
One of the pair was a sender of the money, and the other one was a
13) When future payments were incurred, Dr. Sujauddin carried it out. For each
of the subjects who met the condition, the contract for the future payment
was made among the subject, Dr. Sujauddin, and one of the authors.
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Figure 1 (a).  A sample question in Game 1 
Figure 1 (b).  A sample question in Game 1 
Figure 1 (c).  Other sample questions in Game 1 
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receiver of the money. Whether each subject is a sender or a receiver
was determined randomly after the game was ¯nished. Each subject
was given BDT 1500, and played this game as a sender of the money.
Each subject decided how much s/he sends to her/his partner, and
how much s/he keeps for herself/himself. In other words, in this game,
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each subject divided her/his money into two di®erent purposes: for
herself/himself and her/his partner.
The fourth game was a public-goods game. It is important to investigate
the relationship between preferences and behavior.14) In this game, each
subject became a member of a group that consisted of 4 subjects. Each
member decided how much s/he would contribute for a public/group
project and how much s/he would use for herself/himself. In other words,
in this game, s/he divided her/his money for two di®erent purposes.
The members were chosen randomly. In addition, each member did not
Figure 2 (a). A sample question in Game 2 
Figure 2 (b). Other sample questions in Game 2 
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14) As noted above, we conducted the other game that is called the ultimatum
game. However, because we do not focus on the game in this paper, we omit
its description.
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know the other members of the group exactly. The contribution became
twice as much as the sum of the contribution by 4 members. Then,
the doubled contribution was divided equally into each member of the
group. This game was repeated 5 times/rounds in total in each session.
They could not carry over the payo® to the next round.
3.3 Questionnaire Survey
After the experimental games were ¯nished, we performed a questionnaire
survey. We investigated (i) personal attributes, such as age, gender,
occupation, and income, (ii) subjects' experiences, such as those of
working at shipbreaking yards, (iii) their knowledge on sanitation,
asbestos, arsenic, and accidents in shipbreaking yards, and (iv) their
WTP for improving the environment around the shipbreaking area and
for improving the cleanliness of the public spaces in the communities
where they lived (See Table 2). As noted above, we investigated a
few community attributes in advance such as main occupations and the
distance from the shipbreaking yards.
Table 2. Summary Statistis of Questionnaire Survey
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??? ?? ?? ?? ????? ?????
?????? ????? ????? ???? ??????? ???? ???????
?????? ????? ?? ? ????? ?? ?????
?????? ? ? ????
?????? ? ? ????
?? ???? ? ? ????
?????????? ? ? ????
???? ? ? ????
????? ????? ? ?????? ??? ???????
???? ????? ? ?????? ??? ???????
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4 Preferences and Behavior
In this section, we review the results of the four types of games. In
actual, we are able to obtain the shape of utility function related to risk
preference of each subject using the answers of Game 1.15) However, we
have not completed the full analysis yet. Thus, we use the number of
"more risky answers" for each subject. From Figures 1(c), it is veri¯ed
that Choice B is riskier than Choice A. Thus, in general, the more
frequently a subject chooses Choice A, the more risk aversive s/he is.
The maximum number of choosing Choice B is 35, the minimum is 0,
the average is 22.44, and the standard deviation is 9.60. Although we
examined whether factors such as personal and community attributes
in°uence the risk preference, we could not ¯nd signi¯cant results except
for one factor: Fishers are more risk aversive than other subjects. This
result is intuitive.16)
Similarly, we are able to estimate time discounting parameters using
the answers of Game 2. However, we have not completed the full analysis
yet. Thus, we use the number of "more present-oriented answers" for each
subject. From 2(b), it is veri¯ed that Choice B is more present-oriented
(myopic) than Choice A. The maximum number of choosing Choice B is
45, the minimum is 0, the average is 31.26, and the standard deviation
is 13.05.
The result of Game 3 is as follows. The maximum amount is 150, the
minimum amount is 0, the average is 48.62, and the standard deviation
is 39.68. For this amount of money determined by each subject as a
sender, we obtain signi¯cant results on the relationship between this
15) See Tanaka et al. (2010) for the details.
16) For example, see Nguyen and Leung (2009). In addition, when we derive
the shape of utlity function, we may be able to obtain clearer relationships
between the risk preference and personal/community attributes.
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amount of money determined by each subject as a sender and the
personal and community attributes.
First, female subjects send less money than male subjects do. The
possible reason is that females do not have power to determine how
to use their disposable income. Second, subjects who are living near
shipbreaking yards send more money than those who are living far from
shipbreaking yards. Further survey and analysis are needed to clarify the
reason of this relationship. There are other interesting results, although
they are not signi¯cant. For example, far-sighted subjects are likely to
send less money as compared with myopic subjects. Subjects with high
income send less money as compared with subjects with low income.
There is a possible common reason for these results. Subjects will receive
no return by sending money to their partners. Far-sighted and/or high
income people are likely to be rational. Thus, they sends less money
to their partners as compared with myopic and/or low income people.
The results of Game 5 are interesting. We conducted regression of the
amount of money in Game 5 on personal attributes, experience, and a
community attribute. The result is shown in Table 3. We use natural
logarithm values for the answers of games and income. There are ¯ve
dummy variables in this estimation: Gender is equal to one when a
subject is female, Fisher is equal to one when a subject is a ¯sher,
SYwork is equal to one when a subject has an experience of working
at a shipbreaking yard, Hearinjury is equal to one when s subject has
heard of injury and/or death accidents at shipbreaking yards, and Near
is equal to one when the community of a subject is near shipbreaking
yards. Moreover, Living represents the residence number of years. In
terms of clearness of the results, we adopt the fourth and ¯fth rounds
for dependent variables.17)
17) We did not observe signi¯cant terminal e®ects.
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Table 3. Estmation Results for Game 5
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The numbers in parentheses are t values. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate
statistical signi¯cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
First, ¯shers got less payo® than other subjects. Usually, ¯shers are
poorer than other people on average in rural areas of Bangladesh. Thus,
it is possible that they are not used to predict other members' strategy
and behave rationally. Second, subjects who send a large amount of
money to their partners in Game 3 got less payo® than those who send
a small amount of money in Game 3. The possible reason is the same
as that for ¯shers. Third, higher income subjects were likely to get
more payo® than lower income subjects. The possible reason is that
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higher income people are likely to be good at understanding strategic
behavior of other members and, accordingly, predicting their responses.
Finally, the risk lovers got more payo® than the risk averters.
5 Stated Willingness-to-Pay
Let us turn now to the WTP of the subjects. Di®erent from the
analysis of the payo® of Game 5, we have many zero observed values both
types of the WTP. Hence, we adopt Tobit estimation for examining the
relationship between the WTP and personal and community attributes
and experience. The result is shown in Table 4. In Table 4, WTPSY
and WTPC denote the subjects' WTP for improving the environment
around the shipbreaking area and that for improving the cleanliness of
the public spaces in the communities where they live.
The age has signi¯cantly and negatively in°uences both types of the
WTP. This result seems to be consistent with the basic economic theory.
In general, the older is a subject, the less far-sighted is s/he. Thus,
older people have less incentive to pay for the environment than younger
people.
For the WTPC, it is veri¯ed that female subjects give less contribution
as compared wth male subjects. The same reason for the result of
Game 3 can be considered to exist. In addition, subjects who live in
communities far from the shipbreaking yards give less contribution as
compared with subjects who live in communities near the shipbreaking
yards. It is interesting that distance between their living places and
the shipbreaking yard has a signi¯cant e®ect on the environmental
consciousness. Moreover, for the WTPSY, the number of living year has
a positive e®ect on the contribution. This result suggests that a situation
in which poor people migrate frequently for their job search should be
improved for environmental policies to work e®ectively. Although the
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Table 4. Estmation Results for WTP
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The numbers in parentheses are z values. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate
statistical signi¯cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
result is not signi¯cant, it is possible that subjects who have experience
of working at the shipbreaking yard give less contribution as compared
with subjects who do not have such experience.
6 Conclusion
Focusing on the shipbreaking area in Chittagong, Bangladesh, we
have investigated the WTP of local residents for improvement in the
environment around the shipbreaking area and for improvement of the
cleanliness of public spaces in their own communities. We have extended
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the research of the WTP in the two aspects: First, we also investigated
residents' preferences such as risk preference and time preference using
the method of ¯eld experiments. Second, we delved into the e®ect of
experience.
As explained in the previous sections, we obtain several signi¯cant
results (i) on the relationship between behavior of subjects and personal
and community attributes and (ii) on the WTP and personal/community
attributes and experience. Some of these results are interesting in terms
of pure economic theory, while other results are interesting in terms or
policy implication.
Implementation of proper environmental policies is important not only
for the local environment but also in international aspect. For example,
improper environmental policies distort the market prices, which leads
to a situation in which the industrial structure based on comparative
advantage cannot be achieved.
The results demonstrated in this paper are preliminary. In particular,
following the literature, we have to delve into the data of games such
as those of risk and time preferences.
References
[1] Amador, F. J., Gonzalez, R. M., Ramos-Real, F. J., 2013. Supplier
choice and WTP for electricity attributes in an emerging market: The
role of perceived past experience, environmental concern and energy
saving behavior, Energy Economics 40, 953-966.
[2] Anderson, C. M., Freeman, M. A., Sutinen, J. G., 2008. A laboratory
analysis of industry consolidation and di®usion under tradable ¯shing
allowance management. In: Todd, C. L., Kroll, S. and, Shogren, L,
J. (eds) Environmental Economics, Experimental Methods, pp.29-46.
Routledge.
| 57 |
?????? 68 ?? 2 ?
[3] Anderson, C. M., 2004. How institutions a®ect outcomes in laboratory
tradable ¯shing allowance systems. Agricultural and Resource Economics
Review 33, 193-208.
[4] Anderson, C. M. and Sutinen, J. G., 2005. A laboratory assessment
of tradable ¯shing allowances. Marine Resource Economics 20, 1-23.
[5] Anderson, C. M. and Sutinen, J. G., 2006. The e®ect of initial lease
periods on price discovery in laboratory tradable ¯shing allowance
markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61, 164-180.
[6] Becker, G. S., Mulligan, C. B., 1997. The endogenous determination
of time preference, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 729-758.
[7] Bryan, S., Jowett, S., 2010. Hypothetical versus real preferences: results
from an opportunistic ¯eld experiment, Health Economics 19, 1502-1509.
[8] Buckley, N. J., Cu®, K., Hurley, J., McLeod, L., Nuscheler, R., Cameron,
D., 2012. Willingness-to-pay for parallel private health insurance: evidence
from a laboratory experiment, Canadian Journal of Economics 45,
137-166.
[9] Camecho-cuena, E., Garcia-gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Sabater-grande,
G., 2004. An experimental validation of hypothetical WTP for a
recyclable product, Environmental and Resource Economics 27, 313-335.
[10] Chowdhury, S., Meenakshi, J. V., Tomolins, K. I., Owori, C., 2011. Are
consumers in developing countries willing to pay more for micronutrient-
dense bioforti¯ed foods? Evidence from a ¯eld experiment in Uganda,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93, 83-97.
[11] Dercon, S., 1996. Risk, crop choice, and savings: Evidence from
Tanzania, Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, 485-513.
[12] Disdier, A., Marette, S., 2013. Globalisation issues and consumers'
purchase decisions for food products: Evidence from a laboratory
experiment, European Review of Agricultural Economics 40, 23-44.
[13] Harbaugh, W. T., Krause, K., Lise, V., 2002. Risk attitudes of children
and adults: Choices over small and large probability gains and losses,
Experimental Economics 5, 53-84.
[14] Makino, M., Matsuda, H. 2005. Co-management in Japanese coastal
¯sheries: institutional features and transaction costs, Marine Policy 29,
441-450.
[15] Netzer, N., 2009. Evolution of time preferences and attitudes toward
risk, American Economic Review 99, 937-955.
| 58 |
Higashida?Stated Environmental Consciousness and Preferences
[16] Nguyen, Q., Leung, P. S., 2009. Do ¯shermen have di®erent attitudes
toward risk? An application of prospect theory to the study of
Vietnamese ¯shermen, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
34, 518-538.
[17] Puthucherril, T. G., 2010. From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling
| Evolution of a Legal regime |, Martinus Nijho® Publishers.
[18] Tanaka, K., Higashida, K., Managi, S., 2014. A laboratory assessment
of the choice of vessel size under individual transferable quota regimes,
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 58, 353-373.
[19] Tanaka T., Camerer, C. F., Nguyen, Q., 2010. Risk and time preferences:
Linking experimental and household survey data from Vietnam, American
Economic Review 100, 557-571.
[20] Uchida, E., Uchida, H., Lee, J., Ryu, J., Kim, D., 2011. TURFs and
clubs: empirical evidence of the e®ect of self-governance on pro¯tability
in South Korea's inshore (maul) ¯sheries, Environment and Development
Economics 17, 41-65.
[21] Velez, M. A., Murphy, J. J., Stranlund, J. K., 2010. Centralized
and decentralized management of local common pool resources in the
developing world: Experimental evidence from ¯shing communities in
Colombia, Economic Inquiry 48, 254-265.
[22] Voors, M. J., Nillesen, E. E. M., Verwimp, P., Bulte, e. H., Lensink,
R., Van Soest, D. P., 2012. Violent con°ict and behavior: A ¯eld
experiment in Burundi, American Economic Review 102, 941-964.
| 59 |
